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Century until the Great Depression, banks, insurance companies and other large 
institutional investors supplied railways with external capital that supported their rise to near hegemony over 
transport in the U.S. This regime ended in the 1930‟s, when widespread rail bankruptcies threatened broader 
credit markets. The federal government intervened via a powerful, new, public financial intermediary—the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation—to socialize devalued rail debt, which largely removed private 
institutional investors from rail capital markets. At this defining moment, the Roosevelt Administration could 
have used its financial and political leverage to rationalize structural weaknesses in the rail industry. It did 
not. Thus by the time the Depression ended, railways were significantly weakened vis a vis their increasingly 
successful competitors in highway-based transport. Thus, the decline of American railways was caused more 
by financial factors than, as existing historiography suggests, by either excessive government regulation or 
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INTRODUCTION 
For almost a century, starting in the mid-1800‟s, railways dominated transport in the United States. 
Then, a seismic shift occurred as cars, buses and trucks became the dominant carriers of passenger and 
freight traffic and the rail industry declined to a shadow of its former self. This shift began around 
World War I, reached its tipping point during the Great Depression and was consolidated after the end of 
World War II. A variety of factors contributed to the change, including inflexible regulation of railway 
rates; provision of government subsidies to highways, but not railways; inequitable taxation of railways; 
and failures of rail management. While these aspects of the decline of rail have been well studied, an 
important gap in the relevant historiography involves changes in the provision of capital to railways, 
particularly during the watershed years of the Great Depression. Before the 1930‟s, railways depended 
in significant measure on large financial institutions—banks, insurance companies, endowments, trusts 
and other institutional investors—to supply them with capital coming from other than internally 
generated earnings. Financial institutions acted both as intermediaries, selling stock and bonds, and 
purchased large quantities of rail securities for their own asset portfolios. At the turn of the 20
th century, 
22% of asset portfolios of large financial institutions were in rail stock and bonds.
1 Between that point in 
time and the onset of the Great Depression, even in the face of significant growth of highway-based 
transport, institutional investors continued to increase their holdings of rail assets. But then, during the 
defining moment of the great Depression, they changed course and divested from rail, aided and abetted 
by the interventions of a newly created, powerful, public financial intermediary, the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation (RFC). The RFC was created in 1932 by President Herbert Hoover and expanded 
under President Franklin Roosevelt partly to deal with the presence of large amounts of devalued and 
illiquid rail securities on bank balance sheets, which was contributing to a freeze in private credit. In the 
early 1930‟s the RFC purchased hundred of millions of dollars worth of these devalued securities and   3 
thereby helped to stabilize both bank and railway company finances. But, by socializing rail securities, 
the RFC also contributed to removing private institutional investors from rail capital markets, 
decoupling them from their historic relationship as primary suppliers of external capital to railways. 
Thus, RFC policies produced the unintended consequence of weakening the supply of external, private 
capital to railways. Combined with President Roosevelt‟s failure to intervene strongly to rationalize the 
rail industry, this is, I argue, is an important, but until now, overlooked reason why railways entered the 
post-World War II era in a weakened position via a vis their competitors in highway-based transport.   
 
In researching the historic change that occurred in the relationship between institutional investors, the 
state and railways during the 1930‟s, I address three related questions: first, why did financial 
institutions continue to maintain large holdings in railway securities in the decades before the Great 
Depression even though they were witnessing the rise of significant competition from highway-based 
transport? Second, what specific circumstances caused them to shift out of rail finance in the 1930‟s? 
Third, how did politics combine with capital finance during the inter-war years to affect the subsequent 
shift towards the dominance of highway transport in the U.S.? In answering these questions, this article 
provides new evidence concerning ways in which historic changes in the structuring of capital finance 




Running through much of the historiography concerning the decline of railroads in the United States is a 
debate—sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit—between those who blame excessive government 
regulation and those who attribute rail‟s problems to the internal failures of corporate management. 
Albro Martin is a major exemplar of the former school. He argues that “the unwillingness of the   4 
Interstate Commerce Commission to grant general rate increases…(after) the enactment of the Hepburn 
Act in 1906 prevented the flow of investment funds from keeping pace with the demands upon the 
system and paved the way for a collapse in profitability of railroad operations after 1911.”
2 In the latter 
school are Thompson, Cochran and others who argue that rail management failed to adapt to the 
changing competitive landscape of transportation, especially to the rapid growth of highway-based 
transport after World War I.
3  
 
My research suggests that this debate establishes a false dichotomy inn that it ignores the ways in which 
major public and private financial institutions influenced the shift from railway to highway dominance 
of American transport, particularly during the 1930‟s. Although the role of banks and insurance 
companies in financing the development of American railways in the period before World War I is 
richly documented in rail historiography,
4 the investment policies of these and other large institutional 
investors in the inter-war years is far less well studied. Two most important studies for this period are 
Carosso‟s landmark history of investment banking
5 and Goldsmith‟s equally important compilation of 
primary data on the assets of banks and insurance companies, 1900-1952.
6 Supplementing these are 
Kotz‟s synthesis of research on bank control of corporations
7 and more specific studies of banking and 
insurance in the inter-war years.
8 For the Great Depression, works by Olson, Schiffman and Mason 
explain the operations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation during the New Deal;
9 Rose and 
others provides important insights into the politics of transportation policy in the years leading up to and 
during the 1930‟s;
10 and Bordo‟s notion of a “defining moment”
11 provides a conceptual handle that is 
applied specifically to the transport sector in this article.   
   5 
Some of the works just cited include primary data used here. Most importantly, the appendices to 
Goldsmith‟s book include information from the Federal Reserve Bank and Comptroller of the Currency 
on the railway stock and bond holdings of commercial and savings banks, insurance companies and 
investment companies. This specific data has never previously been culled from Goldsmith‟s appendices 
for interpretive purposes.
12 To this I add two important components by including the rail assets of 
private investment banks and trust funds. Those assets do not appear in the Goldsmith appendices 
because investment banks were not subject to government regulation and were not legally required to 
make a public accounting of their holdings. Yet, Carosso‟s monograph and Kotz‟s synthesis of banking 
research indicate that approximately 250 U.S. private investment banks dominated the capital markets 
for railroad securities between 1865 and World War I and continued to play a major role into the 
1930‟s,
13 so my analysis takes this information into account. Similarly, with regard to trust funds, the 
data in Goldsmith‟s appendices is not broken out specifically for railroads. Yet, both Carosso and Kotz 
describe how trust funds were mainly investors in blue chip stocks and secure bonds, of which rail was 
considered the gold standard.
14 Thus, I include trust funds in this article. In short, my analysis abstracts  
statistics on railway capital finance from Goldsmith‟s broader data set, then adds information on the rail 
assets of investment banks and trust funds. 
 
Four other primary sources also provided pertinent information on rail finances. First, documents and 
data from the archives of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation show how that agency crucially 
influenced the finances of railways and their large institutional creditors in the 1930‟s.
15 Second, annual 
reports from the Interstate Commerce Commission, which was closely involved with monitoring and 
regulating rail finances, are used.
16 Third, specialized reports on railway finances produced by banks, 
insurance companies, allied institutional investors and their professional associations provide important   6 
information on the attitudes and policies of these organizations.
17 Finally, government reports, including 
those of the Office of the Coordinator of Transportation, a key agency that President Roosevelt hoped 
would help solve the transportation crisis of the 1930‟s, provide perspective on the federal response 
during these years.
18 This material is supplemented by secondary sources that deal with the investment 
behavior of large institutional investors. 
 
SOURCES AND OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL FOR RAIL 
From their beginnings in the 19
th century, railroads relied significantly on external sources of financing 
that supplemented internally generated earnings to supply capital for construction and expansion. Some 
of this external capital came from public sources, such as state and local governments, which either 
purchased  railway  stock  or  provided  direct  loans;  some  came  from  land  grants  from  the  federal 
government (though these mainly supported the western and trans-national railroads built after 1850); 
and some came from individual investors.
19 However, by  the mid to late 19
th century large private 
institutions  came  to  dominate  external  rail  finance.  Investment  banks  such  as  J.  P.  Morgan  and 
Company, Kuhn Loeb, Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers; commercial banks such as First National 
of  New  York;  and  insurance  companies  such  as  New  York  Life  and  Equitable,  issued  hundred  of 
millions of dollars worth of stock and bonds (loans) that allowed railway corporations to construct new 
lines, merge with one another, and to expand both regionally and nationally. As these institutions issued 
and traded rail securities they took control of emerging American financial markets and, in the absence 
of strong government regulation, they manipulated stock prices, issued both overvalued (“watered”) 
stock  and  excessive  loans,  and  built  large  fortunes.  Thus  the  stocks  and  bonds  of  private  rail 
corporations became the most prevalent form of securities traded in U.S. capital markets by the late 19
th   7 
century,
20 and private institutional finance largely supplanted public sou rces in providing capital for 
railroad construction, mergers and acquisitions.  
 
While both equity (stock) and  debt (bonds) supported the capital requirements of American railways  
throughout their history, by the first decade of the 20
th century bonds became the main instrument used 
to  raise  funds  and  much  of  that  debt  was  held  as  an  asset  within  the  portfolios  of  large  financial 
institutions. Table 1 shows that a larger amount of rail stock than bonds had been issued and was 
outstanding as of 1900 ($5.8 billion stock; $4.9 billion bonds). However, by the beginning of World War 
I, in 1914, bonded debt outstanding had increased by over 100%, to $10.1 billion, while equity capital 
had increased by less than 50%, to $8.7 billion. Greater reliance on bonds than stock to provide rail 
capital continued after World War I and up to the Great Depression. Table 1 also shows that the par 
value of outstanding stock increased only 8.8% between 1920 and 1929, from  $9.1 billion to $9.9 
billion, while bonded debt rose almost 18.1%, or by $2 billion. On the eve of the Great Depression, the 
ratio of bonds to stock for railroads was 1.22.
21  
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Rail Bonds
1                    % Rail Stocks
2      % Total Stock and Bonds Total Percentage
1900 4,932 45.7% 5,850 54.3% 10,782 100%
1901 5,210 47.3% 5,806 52.7% 11,016 100%
1902 5,837 49.2% 6,024 50.8% 11,861 100%
1903 6,276 50.5% 6,156 49.5% 12,432 100%
1904 6,528 50.7% 6,340 49.3% 12,868 100%
1905 6,977 51.6% 6,554 48.4% 13,531 100%
1906 7,440 52.2% 6,804 47.8% 14,244 100%
1907 7,825 51.5% 7,357 48.5% 15,182 100%
1908 8,222 52.7% 7,374 47.3% 15,596 100%
1909 8,676 53.0% 7,686 47.0% 16,362 100%
1910 9,055 52.7% 8,113 47.3% 17,168 100%
1911 9,189 52.0% 8,471 48.0% 17,660 100%
1912 9,507 52.4% 8,623 47.6% 18,130 100%
1913 9,802 53.2% 8,611 46.8% 18,413 100%
1914 10,054 53.7% 8,680 46.3% 18,734 100%
1915 10,258 53.3% 8,995 46.7% 19,253 100%
1916 10,385 53.4% 9,059 46.6% 19,444 100%
1917 10,381 52.7% 9,302 47.3% 19,683 100%
1918 10,389 53.4% 9,055 46.6% 19,444 100%
1919 10,349 53.2% 9,091 46.8% 19,440 100%
1920 10,334 53.1% 9,113 46.9% 19,447 100%
1921 10,474 53.6% 9,076 46.4% 19,550 100%
1922 10,573 53.6% 9,141 46.4% 19,714 100%
1923 10,842 54.0% 9,250 46.0% 20,092 100%
1924 11,114 54.0% 9,474 46.0% 20,588 100%
1925 11,785 55.3% 9,539 44.7% 21,324 100%
1926 11,813 55.5% 9,485 44.5% 21,298 100%
1927 11,950 55.3% 9,663 44.7% 21,613 100%
1928 12,216 55.4% 9,843 44.6% 22,059 100%
1929 12,225 55.2% 9,918 44.8% 22,143 100%
1930 12,349 55.1% 10,083 44.9% 22,432 100%
1931 12,768 55.9% 10,080 44.1% 22,848 100%
1932 12,812 55.9% 10,114 44.1% 22,926 100%
1933 12,600 55.5% 10,099 44.5% 22,699 100%
1934 12,430 55.3% 10,038 44.7% 22,468 100%
1935 12,408 55.3% 10,023 44.7% 22,431 100%
1936 12,212 54.9% 10,029 45.1% 22,241 100%
1937 12,261 54.8% 10,114 45.2% 22,375 100%
1938 12,169 54.7% 10,089 45.3% 22,258 100%
1939 11,978 54.3% 10,075 45.7% 22,053 100%
Nominal value, common and preferred stock outstanding.
Table 1
Composition of Capital Raised By Railroads, 1900-1939
2Source: Commission, Interstate Commerce. “Statistics of Railways in the United States.” edited by Bureau of Statistics, 153:
Government Printing Office, 1942.
(in millions)
1Source: Hickman, W.B. (1953), "The Volume of Corporate Bond Financing since 1900," Princeton, N.J.: Princeton. Table A-1, p. 252.




Railways and their institutional investment sponsors had many sound reasons for using debt (bonds) 
more than equity (stock) to raise capital, but this choice would ultimately come back to haunt both   9 
parties and play an important role in affecting structural change within the transport sector.
22 Heavier 
reliance on bonds than stock to raise capital created high fixe d interest payments for railroads and 
recurrent requirements to pay off principal as bonds matured. Since the timing of  those interest and 
principal payments was fixed, rail corporations could not adjust their payments to match fluctuations in 
operating income that occurred due to broader economic changes, such as recessions. Thus, management 
was burdened with debt service payments over which they had little control. Stock, on the other hand, 
bore no such fixed financial burdens. When operating income faltered, management could cut dividends 




So, why did railroad management rely more heavily on debt (bonds) rather than on equity (stock) to 
raise capital and why did financial institutions encourage this behavior both by  originating loans to 
railways and by holding a significant portion of those loans in their own portfolios? Some of the reasons 
are exogenous. For example, for insurance companies and sa vings banks, government regulations 
prohibited large equity holdings within their financial reserves.
24  Also, foreign holders of U.S. rail 
securities, who provided significant amounts of capital to railroads,
25 especially in the period before 
World War I, favored bonds because they  valued their greater security (in the form of a lien on a 
company about which—from a long distance—they knew relatively little);
26 carried a fixed return, could 
often be purchased at discount and redeemed on maturity at par and car ried less risk than equities.
27 
Also, the corporate policies of both rail corporations and their financial sponsors favored  borrowing 
rather than sale of stock to avoid giving give greater corporate control to equity shareholders.
28    
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Most importantly, institutional investors favored bonds because they afforded excellent opportunities for 
earning profits at a relatively low risk. During the early development of capital markets in the U.S., 
particularly after the Civil War, reducing perceived risk was crucial to attracting investment. This was 
more easily accomplished with bonds than stock since bonds were often guaranteed by government 
jurisdictions 
29 and since an estimated 90% of bonds were backed by real assets.
30 In addition, rail bonds 
were usually guaranteed by liens on railway real estate (land and terminals, for example) or rolling stock 
(engines and railcars), which provided security for lenders.  Equipment trust obligations, through which 
railways  bought  rolling  stock  and  locomotives  via  a  lease-purchase  agreement,  with  title  to  the 
equipment vested in a financial trustee until payments were completed, became a major type of loan 
made to railways in the early 20
th century. In the event of non-payment of debt service, the lenders knew 
that they could repossess and re-sell the physical assets to recoup their investment. As a result, on the 
eve of the Great Depression, these loans made up 9% of total funded debt for railways.
31 
 
Even though bonds provided certain hedges against risk, railway finances were still subject to losses that 
occurred within the highly competitive environment of railway development, particularly the not 
infrequent recessions and depressions of the 19
th and early 20
th centuries. This led many railways into  
bankruptcy. The average number of American railways in bankruptcy per year between 1894 and 1929 
(the eve of Great Depression) was 64. The largest number of bankruptcies was 192 in 1894, after the 
Panic of 1893 and depression of subsequent years; the lowest 26 in 1905, a period when U.S. railways 
were thriving financially.
32 Surprisingly, however, when railroads entered bankruptcy, the financial and 
management reorganization that followed actually provided financial institutions with  both a hedge 
against bond losses and a source of fee income. This is a unique aspect of the financial history of 
American railroads. American bankruptcy proceedings were governed by the courts, not by state or   11 
federal law, under a specialized judicial procedure called “equity receivership”
33 in which railway 
ownership or its management representatives invited a bank—usually one which had previously raised 
funds for the railway—to serve as receiver of the insolvent property. Courts almost always agreed to 
appoint bank receivers, even though such an arrangement could be considered collusive.
34 Then, railway 
owners and managers, bankers, and stock and bondholders negotiated arrangements to raise new capital, 
first, to pay off the maturing loans and pending interest payments that originally caused the bankruptcy; 
and second, to purchase new rolling stock and rebuild the often deteriorated infrastructure of the 
railway. In a typical reorganization agreement stockholders paid an assessment, in return for which they 
received newly issued stock in the company, while bondholders—mainly large financial institutions—
took losses on their devalued securities as new debt was issued. But, while the stockholders were usually 
left holding “watered” stock which might not bear dividends for a long time, if ever, bondholders held 
assets that usually gained in value when the reorganized company returned to profitability.
35 In addition, 
financial institutions reaped large fees repackaging and re-selling the bonds that were issued as part of 
reorganization.
36 In short, in most American rail bankruptcies equity capital (stock) was put at more risk 
than credit (bonds), and institutional creditors (bondholders) generally emerged in a stronger condition 
than stockholders. This adds further evidence to the proposition that financial institutions believed rail 
bonds were a worthwhile asset to hold in their portfolios.   
 
In sum, by the first decade of the 20
th century, rail bonds had become the gold standard of securities in 
the U.S.  capital  markets, which institutional  investors  favored over  equity for  a variety of  reasons, 
including, first, the security those bonds offered through liens on the physical equipment of railroads; 
second, due to laws that forced insurance companies to invest mainly in bonds, which were considered 
safer than  stocks; third,  because the legal  structure of equity receivership  (bankruptcy) proceedings   12 
included profit incentives to investors to issue bonds; and, finally, by raising capital through debt, rather 
than equity, railroad management could more readily limit shareholder influence. Thus, as railroads 
swept across the American landscape between the last quarter of the 19
th century and World War I, they 
did so with the support of banks, insurance and investment companies and trusts that issued rail bonds, 
which they stockpiled in their own asset portfolios. Though they also issued, purchased and profited 
from railway stock, the increase in rail debt relative to equity is the most important trend within rail 
capital finance history during this period.  
 
CHANGES IN PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION  
Between 1900 (the first date for which systematic data is available) and 1929, on eve of the Great 
Depression, financial institutions significantly increased their rail assets, though those decreased relative 
to other assets within their overall portfolios. Table 2 shows that, for all major financial institutions, 
holdings of rail securities increased from 1900 to 1912, just before World War I, and continued to 
increase even after the War, when competition from highway-based transport was beginning to cut 
seriously into freight and passenger revenues. Specifically, insurance companies increased their holdings 
of  rail  securities  from  $667  million  in  1900  to  almost  $4  billion  in  1929,  equal  to  18%  of  their 
investment assets (though down from almost 35% in 1900); savings banks increased their holdings from 
$420 million to $1.4 billion in 1929, or 14.5% of assets in rail bonds and stock (down from 18.5% in 
1900); commercial banks went from $520 million to $1.191 billion, or 2.2% of assets in 1929, down 
from 7.2% in 1900; and investment companies held 17% of assets in rail securities in 1929 (data not 
available for 1900). The decrease in rail assets as a percentage of overall institutional portfolios in 1929 
reflects diversification of institutional portfolios that accompanied American economic growth, not a 
decrease in confidence by banks and other institutional investors in railways. Instead, as the so-called   13 
Second Industrial Revolution took hold in the U.S., with tremendous expansion in industries such as 
steel and public utilities, financial institutions added holdings in those sectors, resulting in a relative 
decline in their rail holdings.
37 Thus, even as they  diversified, Table 2 shows that, on the eve of the 
Great Depression in 1929, rail securities remained a major component of the investment portfolios of 




































Mutual Savings Banks 420 2,269 18.5% 771 3,797 20.3% 934 6,313 14.8% 1,375 9,472 14.5%
Commercial Banks 520 7,207 7.2% 929 16,468 5.6% 1,269 38,600 3.3% 1,191 53,718 2.2%
Insurance Companies 667 1,915 34.8% 1,745 5,182 33.7% 2,414 10,864 22.2% 3,929 21,890 17.9%
Trust Funds N/A 2,670 N/A N/A 6,090 N/A N/A 16,110 N/A N/A 27,600 N/A
Investment Companies N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 15 90 16.7% 405 2,384 17.0%
Railroad Assets of Major Financial Institutions, 1900-1929
Table 3
(in millions)
1900 1912 1922 1929
1Rail stocks and bonds
2Total Assets includes agricultural loans; household mortgages; unincorporated business and corporate loans; corporate stocks and bonds; federal, state and local government securities; miscellaneous 
and foreign loans. These are same asset categories as in
Source: Goldsmith, R. (1958) Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. A-3, A-5, A-8, A-9, A-12, A-13, A-16, A-21  15 
The financial industry produced a number of reports in the years prior to the Great Depression 
and  even  into  the  early  1930‟s  in  which  they  justified  their  continued  investment  in  rail 
securities,  even  though  railroads  faced  a  rise  of  competition  from  highway-based  modes  of 
transport. For example, a major policy study sponsored by commercial, savings and investment 
banks, life insurance companies and the endowments of elite universities such as Yale, Harvard 
and Columbia, argues that rail is an essential mode of transportation in the U.S. economy and 
defends the emphasis on rail bonds as an investment asset.
39 While acknowledging that “a severe 
decline in the value of $19.5 billion of railroad obligations and shares has occasioned concern to 
institutions which hold such obligations among their assets…,”
40 the report defends railways and 
argues for coordination between railways and other transport modes, “such as highway, water, 
rapid transit and air.”
41 Similarly, a report by the American Bankers Association in the late 
1920‟s avers that the “potential capacity of the motor truck as a competitor of the railroad freight 
car,  and  the  extent  of  actual  encroachment  upon  railroad  freight  traffic,  are  not  relatively 
great.”
42 The bankers argue that “(b)ecause of their longer experience in transportation and their 
trained traffic organizations, the railroads should be able to develop and operate motor coach and 
freight truck service better than the new motor vehicle companies…”.
43 They also believed that, 
while “auto is a major part of the U.S. economy…, it hardly seems probable that the degree of 
increase in motor vehicles in the next five years will be as great as the increase during the past 
five years.”
44 They support railroad purchases of trucking companies that provide short haul 
services,  which  supplement  the  long  haul  advantages  of  rail.
45  These  are  statements  by 
institutional investors who do not appear overly worried about the challenges posed for railroads 
by highway-based transport.  
   16 
However, countervailing evidence suggests that some money managers were concerned about 
competition from highway-based transport. A 1934 report by Joseph Eastman, the Federal 
Coordinator of Transportation, states that “a member of the Coordinator‟s staff interviewed 
numerous officers who have charge of the investment of large amounts of capital for insurance 
companies, banks, and like institutions, as well as large personal investors. He found that they 
are beset by fears with respect to railroad investments…. They fear the competition of motor 
trucks and other transportation agencies…and a host of other things (such as excessive regulation 
of railway rates).” 
46 It is possible, therefore, that bankers and other large institutional investors 
recognized the threat of high-based transport to the underlying valuations of railway securities in 
their portfolios, but also believed that railway management was taking appropriate steps to 
control the deleterious effects of that competition.
47    
 
In sum, in the period between 1900 and 1929, large financial institutions increased holdings of 
rail assets in their investment portfolios. They did so even in spite of significant competition 
from the automobile, truck and intercity bus. Both in their investment priorities and in public 
reports they fail to manifest significant concern about highway competition, even as the 
operating finances of railways deteriorated and as numerous railways entered bankruptcy 
proceedings. Partly this may have been because they saw railway corporate management 
responding to competition in appropriate ways. Partly, too, they had witnessed instability in rail 
finances for a long time, well back into the 19
th century, but had usually turned that instability to 
their own financial advantage through the equity receivership process. Furthermore, because they 
had diversified assets through investments in non-rail industries during the Second Industrial 
Revolution, their portfolios were somewhat hedged from risk and their portfolios generated 
strong profits throughout the 1920‟s.
48 Most importantly, however, on the eve of the Great   17 
Depression, rail securities composed around 15% of assets of all the major institutional groups 
except commercial banks, a heavy weighting in that single asset category--exposure that would  
cause significant problems when the financial crash occurred. 
 
PUBLIC FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
As earnings declined after the onset of the Great Depression, as earnings declined many railroads 
became  unable  to  meet  interest  charges  and  payments  on  maturing  debt.
49  Concommitantly, 
deflation in the value of  railway debt contributed to instability in broader U.S. credit markets. 
This worried not just private bankers who held rail debt in their portfolios, but also officials in 
the Hoover and Roosevelt Administrations, as they tried to maintain the flow of credit in capital 
markets in the early years of the Depression.  To deal with the credit crisis, President  Hoover 
signed legislation near the end of his term in office in 1932 creating the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC). The RFC quickly became an influential force in the U.S. credit markets, 
acting as a public financial intermediary. Congress appropriated $4 billion and authorized the 
RFC to operate as a revolving loan fund so that, as loans were repaid, new debt could be issued 
without recourse to additional Congressional appropriations. Soon thereafter, newly elected 
President  Franklin  Roosevelt  signed  the  Emergency  Banking  Act  (March  9,  1933)  and 
subsequent amendments (June 10, 1933), which gave the RFC additional powe rs, including 
authority to lend to financial institutions; to buy stock in banks and insurance companies; to buy 
stock in  private  corporations,  including  railroads,  and  use  its  equity  position  to  influence 
corporate policy; to issue bonds that used assets,  such as railcars, as collateral; and to provide 
funds to government agencies that, in turn ,  could lend to public and private organizations,   18 
including railways.
50 In short, the RFC had the power to intervene in both financial markets and 
corporate boardrooms. 
 
The first government agency of its kind in America n financial history, the RFC‟s influence on 
railway finances were particularly significant. It loaned over $200 million to railroads in the first 
year of its existence
51 and then, from 1933 to 1940, loaned an additional $704 million, for total 
credits of close to one billion dollars before World War II.
52 The types of credit extended by the 
RFC to railways varied according to both its evolving legislative mandates and changes in 
economic conditions. From 1932 to 1934, as Table 3 shows, 92.9% of RFC‟s rail credit activity 
involved direct loans to railroads. Comparable to the short term loans of a commercial bank, 
direct loans provided funds so that railroads could pay recurring interest charges and maturing 
principal on bonds that would otherwise have gone into default. Then, in 1935, after Congress 
gave it additional powers to directly purchase corporate securities, the RFC shifted its priorities 
to refinancing rail bonds. Through that mechanism, it purchased existing rail debt held by private 
financial institutions, usually at par (full) value, not the deflated values they were selling for in 
Depression-era  bond  markets.  The  RFC  then  issued  new  loans  directly  to  the  railroads  at 
discounted interest  rates, thereby lowering  railway  debt  service charges and improving their 
chances of remaining solvent. This served the dual function of strengthening the balance sheets 
of railways and of their private creditors. As shown in Table 3, from November, 1934 through 
October, 1936, 76.9% of RFC loans were for “purchases of securities,” which means refinancing 
transactions. Then, in the last three years of the Depression, from late 1936 through October, 
1939, 46.3% of RFC loans were for “retirement of bonds,” meaning bonds were redeemed before 
maturity. These also were largely refinancing transactions that resulted from improved economic   19 
conditions. Rail operating income increased significantly in 1936 and early 1937, and again in 
1939, which allowed railroads to trade in more costly bank and other private debt for RFC bonds 
bearing  lower  interest  rates.
53  In short, through direct loans ,  refinancing  and  retirement of 
existing bonded debt, the RFC relieved private financial institutions of a significant proportion of 
their holdings of deflated assets, removing those institutions in significant measure from their 
historic  position  as  primary  suppliers  of  external  capital  to  railways  and  substituting  the 
American government as the railway‟s main creditor.  
Jan. 22, 1932-
Oct. 31, 1934







1 482,274,313 92.9% 24,235,548 13.4% 47,928,459 44.0%
Purchases of Securities
2 N/A N/A 143,606,450 79.6% 9,300,000 8.5%
Retirement of Bonds
3 N/A N/A 12,405,667 6.9% 50,391,971 46.3%
Miscellaneous
4 37,089,782 7.1% 274,200 0.2% 1,205,875 1.1%
TOTAL 519,364,095 100% 180,521,865 100% 108,826,305 100%
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission. "Annual Reports." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932-1939. 1932-1939. These figures were validated
through primary research with Quarterly Financial Reports of the RFC found in Record Group 237, Archive II, National Archives, Rockville, Maryland.
1Direct Loans includes payment of bond and other securities' interest charges; payment of principal on debentures and equipment trust certificates. 
2Purchases of Securities includes purchase of carriers' loans (some stock), purchase of stock of subsidiary company and purchase of lessor properties.
3The Retirement of Bonds means a bond issue was redeemed before its maturity date.
4Miscellaneous includes rentals, preferential claims and judgments.
Table 3
Amount and Purposes of Authorized RFC Loans to Railroads, 1932-1939
 
 
The RFC‟s interventions in private capital markets during the 1930‟s represent a watershed in the 
financial history of American railroads, the effects of which are reflected in Table 4, showing 
changes in the composition of assets in the portfolios of financial institutions between 1929 and 
1939.  
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Amount  % Amount  % Amount  %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans  19,518 36.3% 8,032 25.4% 8,004 19.5%
Corporate and other Business Loans  21,668 40.3% 9,473 29.9% 9,761 23.8%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds  1,191 2.2% 1,052 3.3% 946 2.3%
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds  4,628 8.6% 2,910 9.2% 2,535 6.2%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 6,713 12.5% 10,195 32.2% 19,723 48.1%
Total 53,718 100% 31,662 100% 40,969 100%
Amount  % Amount  % Amount  %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans  4,603 48.6% 4,665 47.4% 4,075 39.5%
Corporate and other Business Loans  1,333 14.1% 1,174 11.9% 1,003 9.7%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds  1,375 14.5% 1,435 14.6% 792 7.7%
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds  720 7.6% 819 8.3% 714 6.9%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 1,441 15.2% 1,743 17.7% 3,722 36.1%
Total 9,472 100% 9,836 100% 10,306 100%
Amount  % Amount  % Amount  %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans  9,091 41.5% 9,975 43.2% 8,622 27.5%
Corporate and other Business Loans  2,708 12.4% 2,620 11.3% 2,366 7.6%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds  3,929 17.9% 3,614 15.6% 3,372 10.8%
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds  3,873 17.7% 3,970 17.2% 7,748 24.7%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 2,289 10.5% 2,934 12.7% 9,229 29.5%
Total 21,890 100% 23,113 100% 31,337 100%
Amount  % Amount  % Amount  %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans  20 0.8% 23 2.0% 88 6.0%
Corporate and other Business Loans  13 0.5% 15 1.3% 12 0.8%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds  405 17.0% 137 11.9% 170 11.6%
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds  1,918 80.5% 965 83.8% 1,173 80.0%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 28 1.2% 11 1.0% 24 1.6%
Total 2,384 100% 1,151 100% 1,467 100%
Amount  % Amount  % Amount  %
Agricultural Loans, Non-Farm Mortgages and Misc. Other Loans  3,730 13.5% 3,190 13.9% 3,690 11.6%
Corporate and other Business Loans  620 2.2% 560 2.4% 510 1.6%
Railroad Stocks and Bonds  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Public Utility plus Other Stocks and Bonds  19,350 70.1% 13,000 56.5% 19,950 62.6%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 3,900 14.1% 6,250 27.2% 7,700 24.2%
Total 27,600 100% 23,000 100% 31,850 100%
Grand Total 115,064 88,762 115,929
Source: Goldsmith, R. Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy since 1900.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
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Most importantly, this table shows that all major classes of financial institutions significantly 
reduced both the absolute amount and relative size of rail stocks and bonds in their portfolios 
during this ten year period. Savings banks reduced their rail assets by almost half, from 14.5% to 
7.7%  ($1.375  billion  to  792  million).  Insurance  companies  reduced  their  rail  holdings  from 
almost 18% of overall portfolio assets to just less than 11% ($3.929 billion to $3.372 billion). 
Investment  company  rail  assets  went  from  17%  to  11.6%  ($405  million  to  $170  million). 
Commercial banks increased their percentage holdings of rail assets by a very small amount, 
from 2.2% to 2.3%, but the absolute level of those assets decreased from $1.191 billion to $946 
million. Furthermore, as previously noted, these figures significantly understate the amount of 
reallocation  within  institutional  portfolios  both  because  data  in  Goldsmith‟s  “trust  funds” 
category is not broken out for rail versus other sectors and because private investment banks did 
not disclose their stock and bond assets, so they are not included in Goldsmith‟s tables. However, 
the evidence is clear that both trust funds and investment banks were heavily invested in rail 
securities in the early 20
th Century, then divested from them during the Great Depression.
54 Thus, 
divestment from rail securities was broad based, deep and reached across all sectors of American 
institutional finance.   
 
At the same time as they elim inated rail securities from their portfolios, financial institutions 
dramatically increased their investment in federal, state and local government securities, which 
protected them from deflation or bankruptcy risk. Table 4 shows that, between 1929 and 193 9, 
government securities rose from 12.5% to 48.1% of commercial bank portfolios ($6.713 billion 
to $19.723 billion); from 15.2% to 36.1% of savings bank assets ($1.441 billion to $3.722 
billion); from 10.5% to 29.5% for insurance companies ($2.289 billion  to $9.229); and from   22 
14.1% to 24.2% for institutional trusts ($3.9 billion to $7.7 billion). Based on Carosso‟s research, 
I  infer  that  investment  banks  took  similar  steps.  Thus,  just  as  the  Reconstruction  Finance 
Corporation was socializing rail securities and becoming a major public creditor for railways—
thereby allowing financial institutions to remove devalued assets from their portfolios—those 
same private financial institutions were moving their freed-up capital into government securities. 
They fled from rail to the safety of government bonds. 
 
The shift of assets by financial institutions into government securities was more pronounced for 
rail than for other sectors. Table 5 shows that, during the Great Depression, the two classes of 
financial  institutions  holding  the  largest  percentage  of  rail  securities—savings  banks  and 
insurance companies—divested of rail assets at a more rapid rate than they did in comparable 
sectors,  such  as  public  utilities  and  other  corporate  loans.  This  is  also  true  for  investment 
companies, though for these companies the percentage change differences are less pronounced. It 
is not the case for commercial banks, but these banks were never major lenders to railways. 
Thus, financial institutions did not divest from their various asset classes equally during the 
Great Depression in order to move into safe government securities. Instead, with assistance from 
the  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation,  they  divested  more  rapidly  from  rail  than  other 
sectors.
55    23 
1929 1939 % Change 1929 1939 % Change 1929 1939 % Change 1929 1939 % Change
Railroad Stocks and Bonds  1,191 946 -20.57% 1,375 792 -42.40% 3,929 3,372 -14.18% 405 170 -58.02%
Public Utilities 1,382 790 -42.84% 525 517 -1.52% 2,230 4,579 105.34% 301 128 -57.48%
Other Corporate Loans   16,243 8,341 -48.65% 1,011 873 -13.65% 3,391 4,622 36.30% 1,630 1,057 -35.15%
Federal, State, Local Gov't Securities 6,713 19,723 193.80% 1,441 3,722 158.29% 2,289 9,229 303.19% 28 24 -14.29%
Total 25,529 29,800 4,352 5,904 11,839 21,802 2,364 1,379
Table 5
Source: Goldsmith, R. (1958), "Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy Since 1900" , Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Table A-3, A-5, A-8, A-9, A-12, A-13, A-21
Divestment by Financial Institutions (in millions), 1929-1939
Investment Companies Commercial Banks Mutual Savings Banks Insurance Companies
 
 
Yet, arguably, rail assets were not so large that they threatened  the overall viability of large 
institutions. Writing about this issue, C.M. Clay, Chief Counsel for the RFC, suggested that, 
“due to several intermediate rises in bond prices since 1932, opportunities have been afforded for 
(bond)holders  to  weed  out  their  more  risky  bonds  with  a  minimum  of  loss….”
56  Clay  also 
maintained  that  “the  (financial)  position  of…  insurance  companies  and  savings  banks…is 
generally sound….”
57 This contradicts the notion that banks, insurance companies, investment 
trusts, university endowments and other institutional investors were threatened with insolvency 
because of the rail debt they held in their portfolios. Instead, it is equally plausible that, though it 
might have cut into their profits, they could have continued to hold those securities during the 
1930‟s without seriously jeopardizing their overall financial viability and/or could have slowly 
divested  themselves  of  those  holdings  as  market  conditions  improved--and  conditions  did 
improve at various times during the 1930‟s and 1940‟s.  
 
When all is said and done, however, even if they had not divested, private institutions were 
unlikely to have provided additional loans to railways in the 1930‟s because their existing rail 
holdings had suffered serious deflation in value. Thus, the discounted loans provided by the   24 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation were crucial for avoiding wholesale bankruptcy within the 
rail  sector  during  the  Great  Depression.  Federal  loans  during  the  Depression  shored  up  the 
finances of insolvent railroads, which concommitantly attenuated the effects of the Depression 
on the broader U.S. economy. At the same time RFC refinancing transactions relieved financial 
institutions of deflated rail bonds, even though arguably those bonds did not seriously threaten 
their balance sheets. In essence, the American government subsidized the finances of private 
institutions in order to avoid massive bankruptcy in the rail sector.  
 
The interventions of the RFC were unique in American financial history up to that time. Never 
before  had  the  American  government  so  directly  and  massively  influenced  private  capital 
markets. While the government had previously issued treasury bonds to pay for deficits resulting 
from the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Civil War, the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation intervened in capital markets in the 1930‟s more directly, using a wider range of 
financial tools, and on a larger scale than ever before. During the Great Depression, the RFC 
became a national investment bank with immense capital resources and no reserve requirements 
that backed its credit with the government guarantees. It directly took over assets that banks, 
trusts,  institutional  endowments,  insurance  and  investment  companies  were  anxious  to  shed, 
including, notably, seriously devalued railway debt, and simultaneously financed depression-
induced federal government deficits. These unprecedented initiatives represent the beginning of 
the modern era of the U.S. government acting as public financial intermediary.  
   25 
POLITICS AND FINANCE  
While this  article focuses  on the rail industry‟s  access  to  capital,  financial issues cannot  be 
separated entirely from political developments that affected transport in the inter-war period.
58 
Some of these are particularly relevant to the decline of rail, beginning with problems railways 
experienced in dealing with regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) . In the 
U.S. the ICC was at the center of transportation policy  from its creation in 1887  through the 
1930‟s. During these years the ICC‟s purview included rate setting for railways and interstate 
commerce on highways; oversight of rail mergers and acquisitions; issuance of rail securities; 
and advising both Congress and presidential administrations concerning transportation policy. 
However, particularly during the period between the end of the Civil War (1865) and 1900, the 
ICC was less powerful than private corporations, particularly large banks, insurance companies 
and other institutions of  finance capital,  in  terms  of determining the shape of transportation 
development.
59 During that time, J.P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn Loeb, Lehman Brothers, and 
powerful railway corporations such as those controlled by Vanderbilt, Van Sweringen and Hill, 
shaped the mergers and consolidations that swept the rail industry.
60 Since ICC power over these 
mergers was weak, it was unable to eliminate the duplication of lines and overbuilding that often 
occurred.
61 Then, after 1900, the ICC faced a new problem--balancing competition between rail 
and motorized transport.  Before  it could do anything about this,  however,  the demands of 
supplying troops and allied nations during World War I caused Congress to pass the Emergency 
Railway Act of 1917, under which railways were leased to and operated by a new public agency, 
the Federal Railway Administration.  This  set a precedent for direct governme nt control of 
railways and could have  been used to  bolster the  ICC‟s power after the war‟s end.  Instead, 
Congress passed the Transportation Act of 1920, which mandated that the ICC develop plans for   26 
consolidation of railroads, but failed to provide the agency with effective powers to enforce 
consolidation plans and also left a legal loophole whereby rail holding companies could avoid 
regulatory approval for mergers.
62 Thus, even as the ICC developed a series of consolidation 
proposals  during  the  1920‟s,  rail  holding  companies  continued  to  pursue  mergers  and 
acquisitions. For example, the Van Sweringen brothers added to their railway conglomerate in 
the East and Midwest while Vanderbilt‟s New York Central railways and the Pennsylvania Rail 
Corporation  pursued  their  own  acquisitions  and  mergers.
63  Partly undertaken as competitive 
moves  against  neighboring  railways,  these  mergers  often  involved  large,  speculative 
investments, financed by issuance of stock and by new borrowing, the latter often at high interest 
rates.  As a result,  while some  consolidation  of  railways  occurred  during  the  1920‟s,    these 
privately organized mergers failed to overcome the problem of duplication of lines, failed to 
increase the efficiency of rail transport in relation to highway-based competition, and increased 
the debt of railways at the worst possible time, just before the Great Depression.
64 Thus, by the 
end of the 1920‟s the rail industry in the United States was internally divided; had not overcome 
inefficiencies  from  duplication  of  lines;  and  was  losing  passenger  and  freight  revenues  to 
competition from highway-based transport—all just as their finances were seriously weakened 
by excessive debt. 
  
In order to effectively and efficiently compete with the growth of highway based traffic, the rail 
system  required  rationalization—elimination  of  overlapping  rail  lines,  combining  weak  with 
strong companies, and system-wide consolidation to increase efficiency.
65 Thus, early in his first 
term,  President  Roosevelt supported passage of the Emerg ency Railroad Transportation Act 
(June 16, 1933) creating the Office of the Federal Coordinator  of Transportation, which was   27 
empowered  to  investigate,  recommend  and,  if  necessary,  require  changes  to  the  U.S. 
transportation system.  Appointed as head of this new office, Joseph Eastman, who was also an 
ICC Commissioner, urged consolidation and financial reorganization of railroads in order to 
make  them  competitive  with  highway-based  transportation.
66  Based  partly  on  Eastman‟s 
recommendations, the Roosevelt Administration submitted numerous bills to Congress during 
the  1930‟s  dealing  with  rationalization  of  the  planning,  financing  and  re-structuring  of  the 
country‟s transportation system and Congress itself held numerous hearings and proposed laws, 
one of which called for full nationalization of railways.
67  While some important legislation was 
enacted, aspects of the new laws actually weakened railway finances. First, amendments to the 
railway equity receivership law, passed by Congress in 1933 and 1935, reduced  the power of 
financial institutions to unilaterally control bankruptcy proceedings, which thereby increased the 
motivation of financial institutions to withdraw from rail capital markets since they could no 
longer manipulate reorganization to achieve financial gain.
68 Second, the Banking Act of 1933 
(Glass Steagull), ordered commercial banks to withdraw their deposits from investment banks.
69 
Because these deposits had been used as a source of loans, railways lost another potential source 
of capital. Third, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 gave the ICC regulatory power over all motor 
carriers engaged  in interstate commerce, but did not tie that to broader rationalization of 
competition  within  the  transportation  industry.
70  Finally,  the  Transportation  Act  of  1940 
supported a national transportation system that embraced rail, motor and water modes,  but the 
Act  provided  no  effective  power to  the  government  to  implement  such  a  system ,  so  the 
competitive position of rail was not ameliorated.
71 Thus, taking all this legislation into account,  
by the end of the Great Depression American railways were no better off in terms of access to   28 
capital and competitive balance with motorized transport than they had been at the beginning of 
the 1930‟s.   
 
In  addition  to  legislative  change,  President  Roosevelt  could  have  taken  executive  actions  to 
improve  railway  finances.  He  and  his  Coordinator  of  Transportation  could  have  used  their 
numerous points of leverage over the rail industry to force at least consolidation, if not the full 
nationalization plans that Eastman initially proposed.
72 The Transportation Act of 1934 state d 
that the Coordinator‟s Office could, if necessary, “… require action on the part of the (rail) 
carriers...which will avoid unnecessary duplication of services and facilities…”.
73 But Eastman 
was “tentative,…doubtful, hesitant, and elaborately cautious,” according to one major study of 
his  term  as  Coordinator,
74  so he forced no change on the railway industry.  Roosevelt was 
similarly cautious.  At  a  time when both railways  and their institutional creditors  were in 
desperate need of support,  Roosevelt could have used the RFC‟s control of large amounts of 
capital and credit to force railroads to accept consolidation, reorganization and rationalization of 
their  services.
75  Instead,  he  and the RFC allowed railroads to continue to operate a system 
weakened by duplication of lines and services and other inefficiencies which allowed cars, buses 
and trucks to make competitive inroads. In short, Roosevelt and his appointees failed to use their 
political, economic and financial powers to  address the underlying structural weaknesses of the 
railroad industry. Neither executive actions taken, nor new legislation passed in the 1930‟s was 
sufficient to create a transportation system in which railroads could compete effectively with 
cars, buses and trucks. Thus the rail industry began a long period of decline--interrupted only by 
an  ephemeral  revival  during  World  War  II--and  highway  based  transport  continued  its  rise 
towards dominating American transport.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
In theoretical terms, the way public and private financial intervention in capital markets affected 
the shift from rail to highway dominance in American transport is representative of the process 
by which structural change normally occurs within economic sectors in the United States. Private 
institutions, not government planning, largely control credit allocation in the U.S.,
76 which is a 
version of Keynesian liberal economics, sometimes termed “corporate capitalism”
77 or a “capital 
market based system.”
78 This type of system operated in the U.S. from the late 19
th century 
through  the  1930‟s,  as  banks,  insurance  companies  and  other  large  institutional  investors 
supported railway capital needs, even in the face of growing competition from highway-based 
transport. On the eve of the Great Depression in 1929, insurance companies held 18% of their 
corporate  assets  in  rail;  savings  banks,  14.5%;  and  investment  companies,  17%.  But,  as 
depreciation eroded the value of those assets in the 1930‟s, financial institutions divested from 
rail, removing themselves from their historic position both as financial intermediaries in rail 
capital markets and as major purchasers of rail securities for their own asset portfolios. This 
created a significant precondition for structural change because railroads lost access to external, 
private capital. Furthermore, auto, bus and truck producers relied largely on internally generated 
profits to produce their vehicles, so were not as dependent as railways on external financing for 
growth.
79 So, while railroads faced loss of access to external capital in the 1930‟s, this was not a 
problem for their highway-based competitors.  
 
The withdrawal of private capital from railway finance was facilitated by the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation,  a  powerful  new public financial intermediary  created during the Great 
Depression to restore liquidity to frozen American credit markets. The RFC purchased devalued   30 
rail assets and thereby assumed the role of public creditor to railways. However, the RFC did not 
use its takeover of railway credit to force changes in the competitive landscape of American 
transport. The Office of Transportation Coordinator did not intervene to force either elimination 
of duplicative railway  lines  or corporate consolidations  that could  increase  efficiency in the 
industry. As had been the case throughout the prior financial history of the United States, even 
during the crisis of the Great Depression, when the government had a momentous opportunity to 
force structural change in the transport sector, private rail and highway corporations continued to 
make the decisions that determined their own fate. Private planning, not public intervention, 
continued to determine the structure of American transport. While highway transport did not 
become completely dominant in the U.S. transportation sector until the 1950‟s and 1960‟s, the 
interplay of private financial institutions and the federal government in capital markets in the 
1930‟s established significant financial preconditions for that subsequent shift.
80  
 
But, one could ask of those financial institutions that divested from rail securities in the 1930‟s: 
weren‟t  they  just  reacting  to  shifts  towards  highway  transport  that  had  already  commenced 
around the time of World War I? Weren‟t they just avoiding losses and pursuing profits in a 
rational manner? On the contrary, my argument is that these institutions did not react to the 
emerging  structural  shift  towards  highway  transport  in  a  timely  manner.  In  their  published 
reports in the 1920‟s, they gave various reasons why they did not see highway modes as a major 
threat to railways, not least because railway management was taking initiatives to diversify and 
merge with trucking and bus companies. As a result they stayed strongly invested in rail into the 
early years of the Great Depression. Even if one accepts that financial institutions were just slow 
to react to highway competition and that divestiture in the 1930‟s was a belated way of avoiding   31 
losses and pursuing profits elsewhere, once they began to divest, they were making decisions that 
contributed to the decline of rail. This is because, as noted earlier, access to credit in the U.S. is 
controlled by private markets. In fact, whether institutional investors were just slow to react or  
whether they were reactive or proactive at all is not the point. The point is that divestment denied 
railways access to needed capital and left them dependent on public credit. In the context of the 
American market-based system, where government did not use its executive powers to force 
structural  economic  change,  railroads  were  left  at  a  serious  disadvantage  relative  to  their 
highway competitors.   
 
Alternatively, one could argue that the more deep rooted cause of railroad decline was loss of 
competitiveness with highway transport, not divestiture from rail assets by private capital, due 
either  to  inflexible  regulation  of  freight  and  passenger  rates  by  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission 
81 and/or to poorly conceived decisions by railway management concerning how to 
cope with highway competition.
82 However, as proponents of the inflexible rate thesis concede, 
regulation by itself did not inevitably doom railways to failure
83 and highway hegemony was not 
an inevitable outcome of management failures.
84 On both counts, if railways had eliminated 
duplicative lines and consolidated overlapping corporate jurisdictions through mergers, and/or if 
the government had  forced  consolidation  of rail services to bring efficiency to the overall 
industry,  railroads  might  have  more  effectively  competed  with  highway -based  modes  of 
transport. These were not purely hypothetical alternatives. They  were contingent options very 
much under active consideration by railways and government in that historical time period.
85  
   32 
Thus,  the  central  thesis  of  this  paper  is  not  contradicted  by  counterfactual  arguments.  The 
evidence  remains  clear  that,  when  the  Roosevelt  Administration,  through  the  vehicle  of  the 
Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation,  relieved  railroads  of  much  of  their  devalued  debt  and 
facilitated the redistribution of assets within the portfolios of large financial institutions in the 
1930‟s, it could also have used its considerable political, regulatory and financial powers to force 
railroads to consolidate, reorganize and rationalize service. But, because the American political 
economy is not based on an interventionist state, these steps were not taken. As a result, by the 
end of the Great Depression American railways had lost much of their financial strength and 
economic  competitiveness  with  highway-based  modes.  This  allowed  the  motorized  transport 
industry to move towards establishing its dominance within American transport, a position it 
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